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To  explore the impact that piracy has   on demand for legal versions of a  
product  and firm performance, we use the literatures of information  
economics  and strategic management to expand the analysis of piracy to  
markets  other than software. Our paper helps clarify the nature of customer 
demand  for legal versions of products, and gain a deeper understanding of  
the  way that piracy can enhance the performance of those firms that own  
the  intellectual property.  We contend that   although  piracy represents  
unauthorized  imitation of a firm’s intellectu al  property, there are some  
circumstances  when piracy can improve the   value  of the intellectual  
property,  such that there is a net increase in demand for the legal versions 
of  the product, a reduction in the firm’s expenses in obtaining its sales, and 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The  phenomenon of product piracy has received increased attention in recent years from both  
scholars  and practitioners. Product piracy is the misappropriation of inte llectual  property by a  
party  different from the rightful owner resulting in the making of unauthorized copies of a  
product  (McDonald & Roberts, 1994; Conner & Rumelt, 1991). Product piracy violates  
copyright  or patent law that protects the rights of owners   of intellectual property in products  
such  as software, films and books (Burgunder, 1995). The consumer who buys a pirated  
product  is aware that the product is not a legal version of the product but chooses to buy it often  
because it is less expensive.  
 
One  reason for the greater threat of piracy nowadays is the use of digital technologies for  
software,  audio and video content. For example,   it  has been reported that  the  software industry  
loses  billions of dollars of revenues each year from pirates who make   illegal copies of software. 
It  has been estimated that 5 percent of software used in the U.S. is illegal while in China and  
Russia  the rate of illegal copies approaches 90 percent (Horowitz, 2003; Givon, Mahajan &  
Muller,  1995).  Moreover, copied CD music   in a digital format has no reduction in quality due  
to  the ease of reproduction of digitally recorded sound. This was not the case when audio tapes 
were  the technology standard not too long ago   (Conner & Rumelt, 1991; McDonald & Roberts,  
1994;  Globerman, 2001). Technology advancements that make piracy easier and the quality of  
the  pirated products better has forced global public examination and discussion of this  
phenomenon.  Previous research on piracy has focused primarily on its costs (Globerman,   
2001;  Wagstaff, 2002), especially in terms of direct sales losses (Givon, Mahajan & Mueller,  
1995;  Lowry, Yang & Edwards, 2003), costs of brand image erosion (Keller, 1993; Mc Donald 
&  Roberts, 1994), and the costs of enforcement (Rice 2002).  For example, loss estimates due  
to  piracy for the software industry alone have been conservatively pegged at $1.5 billion a year 
(McDonald  & Roberts, 1994; Givon, Mahajan & Mueller, 1995).    Illegal music downloads due  
to  piracy were  blamed  for a $2.6 billion loss in the worldwide music industry in 2002 according  
to  PriceWaterhouseCoopers (Lowry, Yang & Edwards, 2003).  For enforcement, Microsoft  
maintains  a staff of 250 in   its intellectual property protection department to operate as a  
“worldwide police force” (The Economist, 2002).   
 
Only  recently have researchers begun to examine the possibility that product piracy might  
improve  overall customer demand for legal versions   of the product and thus result in benefits to  
the  owners of that intellectual property.  For example, Conner and Rumelt (1991) challenge the  
argument  that software piracy harms producers (through reduced sales) by reasoning that piracy  
could  act to increa se  the customer utility of a software program, thereby increasing demand and  
firm  profits.  Furthermore, they contend that “piracy, because it increases the size of the total  
installed  base, may raise the value of the program for all users.”
1   Using a diff usion  modeling 
approach  on a sample of two types of software in the United Kingdom, Givon, Mahajan and  
Muller  (1995) found that though six out of seven software users utilized pirated copies, the  
pirated  software was responsible for generating more that 80 %  of new software buyers,  
therefore greatly influencing the legal diffusion of the software.   
 
                                                 
1 Of course they also state that piracy causes direct sales loses.  The net effect of piracy depends on balancing 
piracy’s value enhancing effects against the sales that are  lost and other costs associated with piracy.  IE Working Paper                                     DE8-108-I                                         31 / 03 / 2004 
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These  studies use theory on network effects to examine the sales of software products and have 
provided  a strong starting point for rethinking the costs and bene fits  of piracy.  To further  
explore  the impact that piracy has on demand for the legal version of a product, we use the  
literatures  of information economics and strategic management to expand the analysis of piracy  
to  markets other than software, to clarif y  the nature of customer demand for legal versions of 
products,  and gain a deeper understanding of the way that piracy can enhance the performance  
of  those firms that own the intellectual property.  In doing so, we make a number of important 
contributions to the literature.   
 
First,  whereas previous examinations of this phenomena have   primarily  focused  on the costs to  
firms  of having their products pirated, in this article we argue that there are conditions under  
which  piracy can increase dema nd  for legal versions of the product, i.e., when product piracy  
generates  and/or increases network effects, reduces the costs of search and/or information  
processing,  generates a positive signal to the market, as well as encourages both bandwagon  
and herding effects. 
 
Second,  previous research has primarily attempted to quantify the costs of product piracy for  
the  owner of the intellectual property in one industry (software) and at one point in time (static  
research  designs).  In this article, we re -examine  the costs of product piracy by accommodating  
market  heterogeneity-  -heterogeneity  in terms of the (1) the extent of overlap between the  
populations  of customers for legal products and that for pirated versions, and (2) the degree to  
which  customers value   brands.  Without such consideration, the negative impact of product  
piracy  on the demand for legal versions of a product could be substantially over -estimated. 
Thus,  we extend the examination of the effects of product  piracy  to the firm  from the  dominion 
of  software and   network  effects, to the application to all products and include theory of  
informational economics, branding and signaling effects to the analysis.   
 
Third,  previous product piracy research has focused on the effect of  piracy  on demand (or the 
dollar  equivalent  of diminished demand).  Although we follow this lead, we also use the  
strategy  literature to link changes in demand to firm performance, acknowledge the impact that  
the  costs of defending against pirates has on firm performance, and explore the role tha t 
product  piracy has in building barriers to entry, which in turn enhances the sustainability of a  
firm’s performance advantage. 
 
Fourth,  piracy provides an interesting context to explore the inter -relationship  between the  
sources  of a firm’s sustaina ble  competitive advantage.  Resource -based  theories of strategy  
(RBV)  have argued that firms that possess resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and  
non-substiutable  have the potential of achieving superior performance (e.g. Barney, 1991;  
Wernerfelt,  1984).   A branded product can be a source of competitive advantage if the  
organizational  and strategic processes   of  firms  facilitate  the manipulation of   resources  into 
value-creating  strategies ( Eisenhardt  &  Martin,  2000).   When all else is held  c onstant,  less 
imitability  means a more sustainable competitive advantage and it is therefore not surprising  
that  resource-based  scholars have placed considered importance on a firm’s ability to maintain  
the inimitability of its intellectual pr operty.   
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However,  using the information economics literature we argue that the sources of a firm’s  
competitive  advantage are inter -related  such that there are circumstances when less  
inimitability  may have a   positive  impact  on a firm’s sustainab le  competitive advantage because  
it  enhances other sources of sustainable competitive advantage.  Specifically, piracy represents  
unauthorized  imitation of a firm’s intellectual property but, we argue that in some  
circumstances  piracy can improve the   value  of the intellectual property such that the firm’s  
sustainable  competitive advantage is enhanced.  In this context, value is represented by a net  
increase  in demand for the legal versions of the product and possibly a reduction in the firm’s  
expenses  in ob taining  its sales.  The context of piracy also highlights two populations of  
(potential)  competitors-  -those  that produce pirated products and those that produce competing  
legal  products.  Although piracy reflects imitation by one population, we argue that   there are  
circumstances  when piracy can reduce the level of imitation by the other population by creating  
barriers to entry for potential competing legal products.   
 
We  believe that this paper helps address inconsistencies between theory and observed  
phenomena  in the area of intellectual property misappropriation.  For example, in the case of  
software,  the pirating of Windows operating system software and Microsoft office products has  
helped  cement Microsoft’s dominance in the PC software industry in devel oping  countries in  
Asia  and Latin America, bringing customers into the fold that could not afford legal versions of 
the  products.  In a recent example, Microsoft declared an amnesty to software pirates in  
Russian  cyber cafés because it has recognized that  (1)  under the present economic conditions in  
Russia,  these businesses could not afford to pay the “legal” price for the software, (2) the power 
of  Russian police to prosecute these crimes is limited and (3) most importantly, they recognize  
that  users of th ese  pirated products might in the future buy legal upgrades of the software that 
they are most familiar with (Meredith, 2003).    
 
The  case of prestige goods is also illustrative. The Louis Vuitton   brand  is  the single most  
pirated  leather goods brand in th e  world, yet is the largest contributor in sales (30%) and profits 
(50%)  to parent   LVMH  as  indicated in its 2001 annual report.  Traditional theory on branded  
goods  would argue that the signaling effect would not occur because the referent group  
(affluent  buyers  of upscale leather goods) in this case would be in fact repulsed by the fact that 
non-elite  consumers are wearing a similar product acquired at a much lower price.   Thus, 
piracy  should  result  in  brand erosion and lower sales and profitability for th e  product.  
However, net sales of these prestige goods have increased 37% in the last two years.     
Moreover,  in Hong Kong, one of the largest markets for upscale goods in the world coexists  
with  one of the largest pirated product markets in the world.  Si gnificant  sales of inexpensive,  
fake  Rolex watches are sold in close proximity to upscale jewelry stores selling price legitimate  
Rolex  products. Apparently, the market for pirated watches   can  operate symbiotically with the  
legitimate  market and is therefo re  tolerated.  We believe our theoretical arguments help make  
sense of these apparently contradictory phenomena.   
 
The  article proceeds as follows: First, the construct of product piracy is introduced and  
distinguished  from other forms of intellectual prop erty  infringement.  Second, we challenge an  
existing  assumption in the literature to re -examine  the costs of product piracy.  Third, we utilize 
the  literature on information economics to extend previous work on network effects and  
propose  other situations   when  piracy can enhance demand for legal versions of the product.   IE Working Paper                                     DE8-108-I                                         31 / 03 / 2004 
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Fourth,  we utilize the literature on strategic management to explore the relationship between  
product  piracy and firm performance.  Finally, we discuss the implications of our model and  





McDonald  and Roberts have defined piracy as “when products have been copied and sold  
without  the permission of the rightful manufacturer” (1994: 55).  They further differentiate  
between  counterfeiting, piracy and knock offs.  They argue both counterfeiting and piracy  
result  in illicit products, but that a counterfeit product is one which the manufacturer produces  
with  the intention of deceiving the consumer, while in the case of pirac y, the consumer is aware 
that  the product is fake, and that in this case it constitutes a conscious act of the consumer to  
purchase  a fake product.  MacDonald and Roberts argue that the consumer is aware that he or 
she  is buying a fake because of the price ,  purchase location, or obvious differences in design,  
quality  and features. Knock -offs  they define as a similar product that is designed to ride the  
brand or trade dress of the leading product in this category.    
 
For  the purpose of this paper we will con centrate  on piracy.  That means that the intent in this 
case  is not to deceive the consumer as would be the case with counterfeiting, and that the  
consumer  is a willing participant in the transaction.  This definition is important because  
mounting  evidence,  in particular in the case of technological content, that consumers do not  
perceive  the acquisition of pirated products to be a crime or   that they perceive it to be a  
“victimless  crime”.   Furthermore, we assert that pirating occurs when the final price  of the  legal 
version  of the   product  includes a component of the cost of creating the intellectual property .  
Two  classic examples are first software and pharmaceutical products, where the price of the  
final  product reflects the investment in resear ch  and development, and second prestige goods,  
where the final price reflects branding costs and snob appeal.    
 
 
PIRACY AND LOSS OF DEMAND 
 
Pirated products as substitutes for legal products 
A  key theme of earlier studies of piracy consisted of attempts to analyze the costs for firms in  
terms  of lost sales (Globerman, 2001). A critical assumption that was made in these earlier  
piracy  studies was that the sales of pirated prod ucts  directly reduce the sales of legal copies of 
the  product.  However this zero sum assumption can only be made if both buyers of pirated and  
legal  products come from the same population of likely buyers and users of the product.  If the  
buyers  of legal   and  pirated products come from different populations then we can not consider 
all  pirated  copies as lost sales. Therefore, we will look at the implications of holding two  
different  assumptions about the populations of legal and pirated products and the   corresponding 
affects on piracy costs to firms. 
 
First  we will assume that buyers of legal and pirated products come from the same population.  
This  means that the buyer of a pirated product could have paid the price for the legal product 
but  chose to pu rchase  the less costly pirated version of the product. The loss to the company  IE Working Paper                                     DE8-108-I                                        31 / 03 / 2004 
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from  product piracy would be directly in proportion to the loss of sales attributable to the  
substitution  of pirated products for legal products. Therefore, when buyers of legal   and pirated  
products  come from the same population, the sale of each pirated product represents a loss to  
the  firm that is the victim of piracy, and so the accounting for such losses can often amount to a 
substantial cost to the firm. 
 
Now  we relax our fi rst  assumption and assume that buyers of legal and pirated products come  
from  different populations.  This is often the case in the situation where a product is marketed  
on  a global basis  and  one  set of the buyers come from developed countries with  h igh  levels of 
disposable  income, and other potential buyers come from third world countries with low levels  
of  income.   There could be income barriers that keep buyers from pirated products distinct  
from  buyers of legal products.  For example, a student  i n  China may be able to pay one dollar 
for  a pirated software program but does not have the resources to pay the legal price of one  
hundred  dollars for the software from the company that owns the intellectual property rights to  
market  and distribute it.  Wh en  legal and pirated product buyers are distinct should  all sales of a 
pirated  product be considered a loss of sales to the company that has the legal rights to market 
this  product? The answer is that with distinct buyer populations   fewer  buyers  of pirated  
products  would be in a position to buy the legal product.  Therefore the cost of piracy in terms 
of  lost sales to the owner of the intellectual property could be overstated if we do not consider 
the  extent of overlap between the  p opulation  of buyers of legal products and the population of 
buyers of pirated products. Thus, 
 
Proposition 1: The relationship between piracy and demand for legal versions of the product is 
moderated by the extent to which buyers of legal and pirated products come from different 
populations.  The more independent the population of (potential) buyers of legal versions of the 
product is from the population of (potential) buyers of pirated versions of the product, the less  
negative the impact that piracy has on demand for legal versions of the product. 
 
 
Pirated products and the erosion of brand equity 
Brand  equity can be a significant contributor to increased demand for a product and enhance  
firm  profitability (Aaker, 1992), but it can be adversely affected  b y  product piracy.  B rand 
equity  refers to “the marketing effects uniquely attributable to the brand --for  example, when  
certain  outcomes result from the marketing of a product or service because of its brand name  
that  would not occur if the same product or  s ervice  did not have that name”  (Keller, 1993:1). 
McDonald  and Roberts have argued that the “existence of pirated versions of a brand detracts  
from the intangible assets placed on the brand by the consumers” (1994: 57).  
 
McDonald  and Roberts (1994) raise a   number  of interesting points with regards to the  
deterioration  of brand image that can occur due to product piracy.  First, there is the erosion  
caused  by the loss in terms of the intangible assets that the customer places on the brand.  A  
consumer  of Loui s  Vuitton bags is also paying for the exclusivity attached to the fact that only  
a  few people can afford the brand. This allure and exclusivity is eroded by the presence of  
pirated  copies of the product at a reduced price.  Second ,  the presence of pirated   products of 
lesser  quality then the originals, in particular in industries such as the pharmaceutical industry,  




2   Finally, although piracy can ope rate  as a form of vertical extension of the  
brand  into a different market segment (Aaker, 1972) ,downward  stretches in brands can also  
result in brand dilution (Kirmani, Sood,  & Bridges, 1999).  Thus, 
 
Proposition 2: The relationship between piracy and demand for legal versions of the product is 
moderated by the extent to which buyers value branding.  The less value placed on branding, 
the less negative the impact that piracy has on demand for legal versions of the product. 
 
 
PIRACY AND ENHANCED DEMAND 
 
Traditionally,  researchers have concentrated on the cost of piracy (Wagstaff, 2002; Nascimento  
&  Vanhonacker, 1988).  Only recently have researchers begun to examine the possibility that  
pirating  might improve overal l  customer demand for legal versions of the product and thus  
result  in benefits to the owners of that intellectual property.  Advancements in our knowledge  
of  the benefits of piracy for the firm that owns the intellectual property have come primarily  
from  a  “network effects” investigation of the software industry (e.g., Conner & Rumelt, 1991;  
Givon,  Mahajan & Muller, 1995).  In the section s  that follow, we extend the “network effects”  
perspective  to explore the potential benefits of piracy more generally  ( beyond  the software  
industry),  we complement this perspective by using the broader literature on information  
economics  to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between piracy and customer  
demand  for legal versions of the product, and we use the  s trategic  management literature to  
better  understand piracy in terms of its implications on the performance of the firm that owns  
the intellectual property.  
 
Network effects and piracy 
Katz  and Shapiro (1985, 1992, 1994) and Farrell and Saloner (1985) have   provided the basis  
for  discussion of network externalities in the context of product piracy. Katz and Shapiro have  
described  a product with network externalities as one “in which the utility the user derives from  
consumption  of the good increases with the   number of other agents consuming the good”  
(2001:  424).  In the case of products with network externalities ,  the fact that other individuals 
are  consumers of the product increases  product  utility.  These authors give three main cases of 
network  externalities  for products which can be generated by:  (1) direct effects of the number 
of  purchasers on the quality of the product; (2) indirect network effects, when the number of  
customers  of the primary product increases the number of customers for complemen tary 
products;  and (3) when the quality and availability of the post purchase service is related to the  
size  of the service network, which in turn is related to the number of unit sales.  An example of 
the  direct effect of network externalities is when the   number of mobile phone users increases  
                                                 
2 For example, the consumer of a pirated version of Viagra, a drug for male impotence, may experience harmful 
side effects that do not occur when using the legal version of this drug. This problem, however wo uld be more 
salient in the case of counterfeiting, in which the consumer does not know that the product is a fake, than in the 
case of piracy, when the consumer does know that the product is a fake and yet chooses to acquire it. One can, 
however, imagine situations in which either in developing countries, or when customers with low acquisition 
power decide to knowingly acquire a cheaper and unauthorized pirated version of a pharmaceutical, and in doing 
so take risks to their health. 
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the  value of the phone network to each additional customer as the number of users gets larger. 
An  indirect effect of network externalities occurs when consumers of a Brittany Spears music  
CD  also purchase a music vid eo  made by the same artist.  A post -purchase service example of a 
network  externality occurs when a software user also purchases a technical service manual for 
the software in order to better understand how to operate all the software functions.    
 
Both  C onner  and Rumelt (1991) and Givon, et al. (1995) have utilized the notion of network  
effects  to argue that piracy might result in benefits to the manufacturer of software that ends up  
being  pirated.  Conner and Rumelt in their study argue that piracy could   increase firm profits 
due  to  increased  sales  .    The  justification is that piracy supports the formation of network  
externalities  and consequently increases the real number of product users who are attracted to a  
more  valuable  product.  Network externalities occur for software products because consumers  
have an incentive to economize on post -purchase learning and customization costs.   
 
Givon,  et al.   (1995)  contend that pirates play an important role in helping convert potenti al 
users  into actual users of the software, and that many of those users of pirated software  
eventually  acquire legal copies of the product.  Using a diffusion modeling approach, they  
found  that this shadow diffusion has a significant impact on the legal  d istribution  of the  
software.  In their study of spreadsheets and word processors in the United Kingdom, they  
found  that even though six out of each seven units were pirated, pirates influenced the potential  
users  to adopt this software, and contributed to  g enerate  more than 80% of unit sales for these 
types  of software. The authors attribute this diffusion to word of mouth interactions that  
influence the potential buyers of the products.  Thus,  
 
Proposition 3: The relationship between piracy and demand for legal versions of the product is 
moderated by the extent to which product piracy generates and/or increases network effects.  
The more that product piracy generates and/or increases network effects, the more positive its 
impact on demand for legal versions of the product. 
 
Even  though Givon, et al. (1995) do not directly discuss the issue of search and information  
cost  to new buyers, we can infer that one of the benefits to potential consumers is a significant 
reduction  of their costs in the gathering infor mation.   Diamond (1985) differentiates between  
information  gathering for opportunities, which makes the consumer aware of the possible  
choices  available,  and information gathering for the arrangement of individual trades, which  
centers  on the acquisition  p roducts.   Piracy could help in both accounts, by making prospective 
customers  aware of the product, and by making them aware of the base price for the product.   
For  example, Merlo and Schottner (1994) found that as complexity of the decision increases,  
subjects  employ simpler learning rules, and that individuals learn better in low cost learning  
environments.   They argue that this is a result of how much individuals process the information  
they  generate and not of the type of information they generate.  Pi racy  results in simpler  
learning  rules that indicate which products are favored by others, and the information generated  
by  piracy tends to be low cost.  In a similar way, piracy could also affect significantly the  
learning  costs of prospective buyers and   thereby  influence the acquisition of legal products.   
Thus, 
 IE Working Paper                                     DE8-108-I                                         31 / 03 / 2004 
 
8 
Proposition 4: The relationship between piracy and demand for legal versions of the product is 
moderated by the extent to which product piracy reduces the costs of search and/or information 
processing for potential users.  The more that product piracy reduces the costs of search and/or 




Signaling and piracy 
Piracy  can play a beneficial role for the   demand of legal versions of the product through  
signaling.   Based on signaling theory from information economics, Erdem and Swait (1998)  
analyzed  brand equity from a signaling perspective and found that brands are important to  
consumers  because they can  s ignal  product positions credibly, inform consumers about product  
attributes,  and increase customer confidence on brand claims.  Contrary to the cognitive  
behavior  approach on signaling, Erdem and Swait (1998) argue that an informational  
economics  based per spective,  in particular, addresses the imperfect and asymmetrical  
information structure in markets.   
 
Pirating  may act as a signaling mechanism that could serve to increase the credibility of the  
branded  product (legal versions) in markets with asymmetric   and imperfect information.  We  
extend  their arguments on brand equity to the realm of piracy, and argue that pirating also  
reduces  imperfect and asymmetric information to the consumer, by giving the consumer a clear  
indication  of what other consumers in  t he  market value. Piracy would then work to reduce  
uncertainty,  and to reduce information gathering and processing costs for prospective  
customers  of non -pirated  products.  Thus, when shopping for an upscale leather good, out of all  
possible  choices, by exa mining  the brand that is the most pirated, the customer could easily  
determine which brand is most valued by other customers.    
 
Thus  in the same manner that advertising would provide a credible signal about the product,  
Erdem  and Swait (1998) would argue   that  the presence of product piracy would increase the  
credibility  of the branded product and signal to the prospective users of non -pirated versions of 
the  product that this is the “most credible brand”.  Furthermore, piracy would signal to  
prospective  consumers  that out of all possible alternatives to the product, the one that gets  
pirated  the most is the one that produces the most utility to the customer.  That customer utility  
is  such that individuals pirating the product are willing to run significant   legal  and financial  
risks in order to capture some of that utility.   
 
In  addition, pirating, by providing market information as to which products are valuable to  
consumers,  would decrease the information costs and perceived adoption risk of the consumer,  
thus  increasing the product utility for the consumer. Finally, the presence of pirated products  
that  users can compare might enhance the credibility of quality claims about the product and  
might  increase the “snob” appeal by highlighting the difference in  p rice  between legal and  
pirated product.  Thus, 
 
Proposition 5: The relationship between piracy and demand for legal versions of the product is 
moderated by the extent to which product piracy provides a positive signal to the market.  The IE Working Paper                                     DE8-108-I                                         31 / 03 / 2004 
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more that product piracy generates a positive signal, the more positive its impact on demand 
for legal versions of the product. 
 
A  different perspective on external effects on consumer utility involves “bandwagon effects”  
and piracy. Leibenstein (1950) defined bandwagon  effects as  
 
The extent to which the demand for a commodity is increased by the fact that others are 
consuming the same commodity…  It represents the desire of  people to get in the swing of 
things; in order to conform to the people  they are associated with; in order to be fashionable 
or stylish; or in order to appear to be one of the boys (1950:189).   
 
Leibenstein’s  perspective countered traditional economic theory and arguments that the  
consumption  by  one  individual is independent of the consumption   of others.  At the center of  
our  piracy argument is that since an individual’s consumption is not independent of the  
consumption  of others, the phenomena of piracy can help alter consumption patterns of  
individuals  in such a way that the result could be t he  increase of consumption of legal versions 
of the product.   
 
Bandwagon  effects in the context of piracy would serve to inform prospective buyers of legal  
versions  of the product about the appropriate product choice made by other consumers from  
their  referent  group, given that these are the ones that pirates perceive to be the referent  
products.  For example a pirated video game may signal to a customer that the game is “cool”  
and  should be selected over other games.  In the context of bandwagon effects,  b y acquiring a 
product  outside of what pirates signal are the appropriate ones, a customer risks acquiring a  
product that is inappropriate (outside of referent groups choices of products).  Thus,  
 
Proposition 6: The relationship between piracy and demand for legal versions of the product is 
moderated by the extent to which product piracy hastens bandwagon effects.  The more that 
product piracy hastens bandwagon effects, the more positive its impact on demand for legal 
versions of the product. 
 
 
Herding effects and piracy  
Banerjee  (1992) has defined herd behavior as “social and economic situations in which our  
behavior  is influenced by the behavior of others” (p. 797).  In herd behavior, individuals make  
product  choices to mirror or emulate the choices and b ehaviors  of others.   Herding is related  
to,  but distinguishable from signaling, in   that  herding  relates  to individuals   willingness  to 
conform  to social or group norms ,  and unwillin gness  to depart from the herd, even in situations 
when  it would be advantageous to do so.     The  main difference between the two is that s ignaling 
is  associated  with  information arising from the   pirated  product  whereas herding is  linked to the 
behavior  of those that  acquire  it.  Choi (1997) has examined herd behavior in the context of new 
product  introductions in the technology arena and asserts that the interaction of informational  
externalities  and payoff effects could produce herd behavior on   consumers  of new technology,  
who  would want to avoid choosing technologies alternative to the leader because they would  
not want to be left out.  As he states: 
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I demonstrate that in the presence of network externalities, once a technology is adopted and 
its true value is revealed, it has a significant advantage over another technology whose value is 
uncertain in the subsequent technology-adoption process. More specifically, the proven 
technology can be sequentially chosen by everybody even when it is common knowledge that 
the unproven one has a higher expected value.  Thus the consequence of handicapping the 
adoption of the other technology is the prevalence of herd behavior in the technology adoption 
process. (1997: 408) 
 
Piracy  can be an important driver  of  herd behavior, both in the case of digital products as in the 
case  of other consumer products.  When a product has a first mover advantage and is pirated,  
the  herd effects can be deployed which act to raise barriers for other technologies or products to  
enter  the market, even if the technology or product is suboptimal.  The herd effects discussed  
by  Choi (1997) could be accelerated if the product is pirated, which would in turn intensify the  
network  effects, and the perceived product value for prospectiv e  consumers of the legal  
products.   
 
Piracy  could also provide herding effects for prestige goods by providing information to  
prospective  buyers as to which prestige good is more desirable and appreciated by others.   
Sales  of legal goods would drive up th e  rate of piracy, which would also drive up sales of legal  
products  through herding, creating a virtuous circle between legal and pirated copies of the  
products.   This effect would help explain phenomena such as markets in Hong Kong, where  
vast  numbers of   sellers  of pirated copies coexist with a great number of stores selling legal  
copies of the same consumer products, such as Gucci handbags or Rolex watches.  Thus,  
 
Proposition 7: The relationship between piracy and demand for legal versions of the product is 
moderated by the extent to which product piracy provides hastens herding effects.  The more 
that product piracy hastens herding effects, the more positive its impact on demand for legal 
versions of the product. 
 
 
PIRACY, DEMAND, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
Piracy, demand, and firm profitability 
Above  we have proposed that under specific circumstances the loss of demand for legal  
products  from the presence of pirated products is diminished and piracy can enhance the  
demand  for legal versions of the product.  When piracy increases net demand for the legal  
version  of a product, the firm that owns that intellectual property can benefit through improved  
firm  performance.  Increased demand for a product can enhance firm perform ance  in three  
ways:  the firm can charge higher prices for the legal version of the product and sell the same  
quantity  (improved profit margin and absolute profit), the firm can charge the same price and  
sell  a greater quantity of the legal version of the  p roduct  (increase market share and absolute  
profit), or some combination of the two.  
 
While  piracy can improve performance through increased net demand for the legal version of  
the  product, firm performance can also be improved by reducing current expenditu re  on direct  
costs  in enforcing property rights and defending brands against piracy.  Firms employ  IE Working Paper                                     DE8-108-I                                         31 / 03 / 2004 
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international  law firms, private investigative organizations and lobbying firms to activate public  
action  and force customs and police organizations in many   different  countries to act against the 
piracy  of their products.   McDonald and Roberts (1994) have argued that under those  
circumstances  there are higher probabilities of a case of alleged infringement being identified  
and  acted upon.  Yet, the cost of le gal  and political action can be significant, and persecution  
and  prosecution can be time consuming. For example, Cartier declared that they spend in  
excess  of $3 million dollars a year protecting the intellectual property rights of their products in  
over  1 25  countries (McDonald & Roberts, 1994).  Microsoft maintains a staff of 250 in its  
intellectual  property protection department, which operates as a “worldwide police force”  ( The 
Economist, 2002). 
 
In digital media, technological advances have further incr eased the costs of enforcement while 
reducing the likelihood of persecution and prosecution.  Cameron has stated that: 
 
a significant essential economic problem of digital crime is that the impact of technological 
progress has made transactions costs of enforcement potentially too high, partly because of the 
low costs of copyright infringement due to technological advances for there to be substantial 
amounts of deterrence from punishment. (2002:15). 
 
Furthermore,  in developing countries the courts may   indeed be more sympathetic to nationals  
who  create local jobs by pirating the intellectual property of organizations situated in wealthy  
countries.   
 
Therefore,  reducing resources allocated to fighting pirates can have a positive impact on  
demand  for the   legal version of the product and reduce the firm’s costs, both of which enhance 
firm performance.  Thus, 
 
Proposition  8: The relationship between piracy and firm profitability is moderated by the 
extent to which product piracy enhances net demand for the legal version of the product.  The 
more that product piracy increases net demand, the more positive its impact on the 
performance of the firm that owns the intellectual property. 
 
 
Piracy, barriers to entry, and firm profitability 
Above  we have argued th at  although piracy represents unauthorized imitation of a firm’s  
intellectual  property, there are some circumstances when piracy can improve the   value  of the  
intellectual  property such that there is a net increase in demand for the legal versions of the  
product  and possibly a reduction in the firm’s expenses in obtaining its sales.  In these  
situations  the reduction in one source of competitive advantage -  -inimitability-  -is  more than  
compensated  by a gain in another source of competitive advantage -  -value-  -such  that the firm  
may be able to increase its sustainable competitive advantage.   
 
However,  piracy also highlights the need for a more fine -grained  assessment of inimitability.   
In  this context, there are two populations of (potential) competitors -  -those  that produce pirated  
products  and those that produce competing legal products.  Although piracy reflects imitation  
for  one population, we argue that there are circumstances when piracy can reduce the level of IE Working Paper                                     DE8-108-I                                         31 / 03 / 2004 
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imitation  by the other population by creati ng  barriers to entry for potential competing legal  
products.    Specifically,  piracy can help generate barriers to entry through standard setting and  
market size.   
 
Farrell  and Saloner (1987) have shown the benefits of technology standards for competition  
within  an industry.   The presence of technology standards commits producers to compete on  
price  or service, protecting adopters from being orphaned by a losing technology, allowing  
them  to reduce uncertainty and information gathering costs and thus encoura ge  potential 
adopters  to buy earlier.  Farrell and Soloner contend that standardization can replace regulation  
and  accelerates network effects by contributing to the increase in the number of adopters in the  
market.   
 
This  view is consistent with research   by Gandal and Greenstein (1999) who have argued that  
firms  can facilitate setting the standard by extending the market, and looking for ways to create  
network  externalities.  Piracy goes beyond extending the market by having adopters experience  
sunk  and  l earning  costs as part of an installed base of a product (Shapiro, 1999). Later all  
adopters  can be converted into legal users of new generations of the product due to the penalty  
from  experiencing switching costs.   Furthermore, piracy provides a signal to   potential adopters 
of  the likelihood that a technology will become the standard so they can avoid the costs of  
adopting  the wrong technology which may end up being abandoned, a costly mistake.  Having  
one’s  technology as the standard   could  represent  a s ubstantial  barrier to entry  ( Farrell  & 
Saloner,1987; Church & Gandal,  1992).   
 
Givon,  et al.  (1995)  also suggest that the size of the pirated market could serve as a barrier to  
entry  to potential competitors, who might delay and even cancel the  i ntroduction  of new  
products  because of the presence of piracy, and the implications it could have for its own firm’s 
profitability and ability to conquer the market. Thus,   
 
Proposition  9: The relationship between piracy and firm profitability is moderated by the 
extent to which product piracy builds barriers to entry.  The more that product piracy builds 




DISCUSSION OF PIRACY AS STRATEGY 
 
Piracy and diminished demand for legal versions of the product  
Previous  research  on the costs of product piracy has   made a substantial contribution to the  
literature.   It was   not their purpose to provide a generalized theory of   piracy;  rather they were  
focused  on explaining the costs of piracy in a particular industry (software) at a particular point 
in  time.  We were interested in developing a more generalized theory  o f  product piracy and  
therefore considered market heterogeneity.   
 
First,  we proposed that markets (across industries and over time) differ to the extent that the  
population  of (potential) customers for legal versions of the product overlap with the  
population  of (potential) customers for pirated versions of the product, and that these  IE Working Paper                                     DE8-108-I                                        31 / 03 / 2004 
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differences  matter in understanding the negative impact of piracy on demand for legal versions  
of  the product.  For example, the results from early studies on the impact of p iracy on demand 
for  software would likely differ to the results of later studies of software (when the  
product/market  was more mature).  We speculate that in the early days of software, the  
population  of legal  u sers  of the product was   highly independent of the population of (potential)  
customers  of pirated products, although as the product/market for software matured there is an  
increasing  overlap between the two populations.  In such a situation, we propose that   the costs 
of  piracy in terms of diminished customer demand are greater when the product/market is more  
mature.   
 
Stated  differently, if we assume that there is considerable overlap between the populations of  
(potential)  customers of legal versions of the   product and pirated products, when in fact there is 
little  such overlap, it is likely that there will be an over -estimation  of the negative impact of  
product  piracy on customer demand for legal versions of the product.  This approach of  
accounting  for pir ated  sales as lost sales at the regular sales price of the product would only be 
appropriate  if in the absence of pirated products those customers would be likely acquirers of  
the  legal versions. This is not the case   for  a  significant number of customer s  in developing  
countries,  and a number of customers in developed countries. In fact the vast majority of cases 
of  pirating occur in developing countries such as India, China and Latin America. As the  
populations  in developing countries become wealthier,  c onsumers  will then be in a financial  
position  to purchase legal versions of a product. Thus the consumers of pirated goods in a  
developing  country may be perceived as a latent market for legal product versions for the future  
waiting  to be tapped once an ec onomic  threshold of wealth has been achieved by this  
population.   
Second,  we proposed that markets (across industries and over time) differ to the extent  
customers  value brands, and that these differences matter in understanding the negative impact  
of  piracy  on demand for legal versions of the product.  If market differences in the value  
customers  place on brand are not taken into consideration, then there could be a significant  
over-  or under -estimation  of the negative impact that piracy has on the demand   for the legal  
version  of a product.   After  re-examining  the costs of piracy to the firm that owns the  
intellectual  property, we acknowledge that costs are only on e  side of the  e quation-  -next  we 
discuss  the implications of our propositions regarding the positive impact that piracy can have  
on demand for the legal version of the product.  
 
 
Piracy and enhanced demand for legal versions of the product  
In  this article we proposed tha t  there will be situations where the benefits of piracy outweigh its 
costs.  Specifically, the more that product piracy generates and/or increases network effects,  
reduces  the costs of search and/or information processing, generates a positive signal to the  
market,  hastens bandwagon effects and hastens herding effects, the more it can overcome its  
costs  and enhance demand for the legal versions of the product.   These  proposed  relationships 
make  an important contribution to the  l iterature.   By offering situations when piracy can have a 
positive  impact on demand for legal versions of a product, we offer an important counterweight 
to the dominant perspective in the literature that has focused exclusively on the costs of piracy.    
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We are not the first to offer such as a counterweight.  There have been a few studies that have 
begun  to investigate the positive impact that piracy can have on the demand for legal versions  
of  the product (e.g., Conner and Rumelt, 1991; Givon et al., 1995)  and these studies have made 
an  important contribution to the literature.  In this article, we extend their contribution of  
network  effects in the context of product piracy of software products, to provide a model that is 
generalizable  beyond the software   industry  by exploring others aspects of network externalities  
and  to  accommodate  other important constructs consistent with an information economics  
perspective.   In this article, we proposed that markets differ (across industries and over time)  
and  these differences matter in determining the extent that piracy has a positive impact on the  
demand  for legal versions of the product.  For example, the network effects in the software  
industry  might be stronger than in other industries and therefore to   generalize the relationship  
between  product piracy and its positive impact on the demand for legal versions of the product 
found  in Conner and Rumelt (1991) and Givon et al. (1995) to other industries would likely  
over-state  the positive aspects of produc t  piracy.  The same challenges likely arise in  
generalizing  results of the software industry in the late eighties and early nineties to the early  
twenty-first century. 
 
Based  on our model, we argue that reliance solely on the network effects arising from   product 
piracy  will likely understate the positive impact that piracy has on the demand for legal  
versions  of the product because it does not sufficiently capture other information benefits, such  
as  reducing the costs of information gathering, providing po sitive  market signals, hastening  
bandwagon effects, and hastening herding effects.  
 
 
Piracy and its strategic implications 
Should  management  always  enforce its intellectual property rights and actively fight piracy or  
should  it sometimes be passive?  Using  a n  information economics and a resource -based 
perspective  the short answer is no.  In this article   we have argued that the sources of a firm’s 
competitive  advantage are inter -related  such that when a product is pirated (imitated), there are  
circumstances  when  the firm’s sustainable competitive advantage can be improved because  
piracy  has a positive impact on the value of the legal version of the product and/or piracy can  
erect barriers to entry for potential producers of competing legal products.  
 
Therefore,  we contend that rather than the “defend at all costs” strategies proposed in the  
received  literature, product piracy and intellectual property misappropriation should be  
managed  by the firm.  That is, through careful calibration of enforcement, legal ac tion, 
lobbying,  and the use of anti -piracy  technologies, firms should be able to extract some of the  
benefits  of network externalities, herding effects, and signaling, while keeping within  
reasonable parameters lost sales and brand erosion.    
 
This  strategic  approach to piracy management should result in higher long term profits for the  
firm.  Management of the misappropriation of intellectual property should not be a knee jerk  
reaction  against all types because product piracy might be helpful to the firm.    Too much piracy  
obviously  could result in brand erosion, (which is detrimental when customers value brand) and  
in  reduced sales (when the acquirers of pirated products and of legal products are  part of the 
same  population).  Firms should be able to de termine,  given the unique characteristics of its  IE Working Paper                                     DE8-108-I                                         31 / 03 / 2004 
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products,  the optimal space where pirating can lead to network effects, reduced costs of  
gathering  information, positive market signals,   hastened  bandwagon and herding effects and,  
the  generation of barr iers  to entry such that firm performance can sometimes be enhanced by a 
strategy of “tolerating” rather than “fighting” pirates. 
 
It  is interesting to note that Microsoft, has slowed down on anti -  piracy initiatives in Russia and  
China  (Meredith,  2003).   T his  action appears to be the result of both the difficulty of  
persecuting  piracy crimes in those markets, but also because they understand that piracy can  
improve  firm performance through increasing demand for legal versions of the product  
(possibly  at a  l ater  date) and generating barriers for others considering entry into these markets. 
Apparently  they are taking a long -term  view that customers of pirated versions of current  
products may in the future turn into users of upgrades of legal software products.  
 
Givon,  et  al.  (1995)  also suggest   that whether to fight pirates or not is a strategic decision.   
They  suggest that the protective devices be introduced later in the product life cycle stage. At a  
later  life cycle stage customers   (both paying customers and those who received pirated version  
of  the software) would be familiar with the software, product piracy would have already helped  
establish  a standard for the product, and customer switching costs would be higher, so they  
would be more inclined to buy the software.    
However,  it is not our intention in this paper to promote product piracy.  We understand that  
even  though intellectual property regimes differ from country to country, piracy is an illegal  
activity  in many countries.    Our analysis only deals with the reality of piracy and a better  
understanding of the role it can play in crafting the strategy of the affected firm.   
 
 
A comment on unit of analysis 
Even  though in this article we have only examined the problem of piracy   from the perspective 
of  the firm, it is important also to recognize that there are a number of societal issues  
surrounding  piracy with strong implications for both firm and public policy.  Direct effects on  
society  from piracy include a reduction of tax re ceipts  that can contribute to a reduction in  
public  funds to pay for services that benefit the society.  Indirect effects from piracy include  
providing  a context for higher incidences of criminal behavior such as in the way that “broken  
windows”  theory wou ld  predict (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).  Consistent with this argument, an  
increase  in piracy and its lax enforcement would result in societal costs in terms of increases in  
other  types of crimes.  For example, lack of enforcement on piracy could lead to grea ter 
frequencies  of other white collar crimes such as embezzlement, insider securities trading and  
fraudulent  financial reporting to shareholders, leading to economic losses to the society because  
financial markets could lose their credibility with investor s.   
 
Therefore,  and on the one hand, the fight against piracy from this societal perspective would  
entail  mobilizing government resources to enforce the intellectual property rights of firms.   
While  our paper has focused at the level of a firm that is act ing in its own economic interests to 
deal  with piracy, we recognize that fighting piracy may be perceived as a social goal and that  
government  resources may be spent to enforce the rights of firms who are victims of piracy.     
Furthermore,  this  social perc eption  should also be taken into account when   formulating  firm 
piracy  strategy. A  firm using piracy as a strategic tool should be careful to not be tarred as  “soft IE Working Paper                                     DE8-108-I                                        31 / 03 / 2004 
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on  crime” and or  socially  perceived as  encouraging  piracy.  The advantages gained by strateg ic 
use of piracy could be lost due to changes in the  public perception of the firm.  
 
On  the other hand, not all governments are going to view piracy as a serious infraction worthy  
of  using government resources and staff to prosecute the perpetrators.   In   Italy  and Spain, for 
example,  local and federal governments are less interested in persecuting and prosecuting  
piracy,  which they perceive as a minor crime, for fear that strong persecution and prosecution  
of  misappropriation of intellectual property would   result in higher incidence of violent crimes  
such  as robbery and assault, which are perceived to be more dangerous to society. In this  
context  piracy is seen as the lesser of two evils, and it is less likely that government resources 
will  be used to fight   piracy leaving the burden of piracy enforcement to be left to firms who  





While  the literature on product piracy has emphasized its disadvantages, the potential benefits  
of  piracy  have by and large been overlooked. This paper applied the lens es  of  information 
economics  and  strategic  management to provide a balanced perspective of both the costs and  
benefits  of product piracy to the firm which has had its products copied by pirates .   After  
examining  product piracy in terms of   network  effects,  signaling, bandwagons,   and herding  
behavior  we find that piracy in some specific situations is likely to be   less  costly and/or   more 
beneficial  to the firm than in others.  In  o ther  words, we suggest that there will be situations  
where  the costs of piracy outweigh the   benefits  and other situations where the benefits  
outweigh the costs.  
 
Two  important additions to received theory should be addressed at this point.   We argue that  
product  piracy and intellectual property misappropriation should be managed by the firm.  That  
is,  through careful calibration of enforcement, legal action, lobbying, and the use of anti -piracy 
technologies,   firms should be able to extract   some  of the benefits of network externalities,  
herding  effects, and signaling, while keeping within reasonable parameters lost sales, and brand  
erosion.    
 
Second,   even though prior researchers had argued the benefits of network externalities in the  
context  of product piracy of software products, our model introduces the analysis of signaling  
and  herding effects to the examination of piracy, and more importantly, extends the discussion  
to  all pirated products.  Within our analysis, all firms, not only sof tware  firms can examine the  
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